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Abstract: Security has been an issue of contention in healthcare. The lack of familiarity and poor
implementation of security in healthcare leave the patients’ data vulnerable to attackers. The main
issue is assessing how we can provide security in an RPM infrastructure. The findings in literature
show there is little empirical evidence on proper implementation of security. Therefore, there
is an urgent need in addressing cybersecurity issues in medical devices. Through the review of
relevant literature in remote patient monitoring and use of a Microsoft threat modelling tool, we
identify and explore current vulnerabilities and threats in IEEE 11073 standard devices to propose
a new security framework for remote patient monitoring devices. Additionally, current RPM
devices have a limitation on the number of people who can share a single device, therefore, we
propose the use of NFC for identification in Remote Patient Monitoring (RPM) devices for multi-user
environments where we have multiple people sharing a single device to reduce errors associated
with incorrect user identification. We finally show how several techniques have been used to build
the proposed framework.
Keywords: telehealth security; telemedicine security; remote patient monitoring security
1. Introduction
Remote patient monitoring (RPM) refers to using technology for monitoring of patients from their
own homes, which is aimed at increasing access to quality care and decreasing costs of healthcare
delivery [1].
The term cybersecurity is defined by the FDA as the process of preventing unauthorized access,
modification, misuse or denial of use, or the unauthorized use of information that is stored, accessed,
or transferred from a medical device to an external recipient [2].
Healthcare has become a key target for cybercriminals. For example, a recent report showed that
94% of healthcare organisations had been targeted by cybercriminals; this included attacks on medical
devices [2]. Therefore, in the USA, the FDA has been mandated with the responsibility to ensure safety,
effectiveness, and security of medical devices in the country [2].
A healthcare cyber threat report released in February 2014 by Norse and SANS involving study
of malicious traffic aimed at healthcare organisations in the US during a one-month period, reported
49,917 unique attacks across more than 700 devices, with 375 US based healthcare organisations
compromised and compromised devices ranged from mail servers, firewalls, and radiology software [3].
The Norse and SANS report also reported an incident where an attacker compromised a dialysis
machine and tried to purchase goods online using a fraudulent credit card number [3]. This opportunistic
attack can easily put the patient using the dialysis machine in danger if it was to malfunction [4]. These
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findings suggested that RPM systems can be attacked remotely and this can endanger patients’ lives [5].
In addition, it is also highly likely that the potential attackers track activities and health information of
RPM devices over a certain period of time, which highlights the issue of patients’ privacy.
In addition, the literature shows that criminals can steal medical records and impersonate
patients [6]. To address the issue of cyberattacks, some organisations such as the National Health
Service (NHS) trusts in England need to have adequate training programmes in place to ensure their
personnel are protected against cyber threats [6].
Therefore, failure in maintaining cybersecurity and effectively dealing with cyber threats can
not only result in medical devices getting compromised but also can result in data losses, integrity,
and availability, which can lead to potential risks to patients’ lives [7]. Therefore, it is essential that
healthcare providers that use medical devices should not rely on device manufacturers to ensure
security of devices but they should also take steps to safeguard patient information within their
networks [7]. In addition, healthcare providers need to ensure that antivirus software and firewalls
are updated, report any medical device security flaws, and monitor any unauthorised use on their
network [8].
2. Legislation on Health Data Encryption
For protecting personal health data, there is a comprehensive set of legislations including regional,
national, and international legislation. For example, the US legislation such as the HIPAA [9], amended
in 2014, European legislation such as the European Directive 95/46/EC (European Community, 1995),
and UK legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1998 [10] apply to electronic as well as paper
approaches of health record management. These legislations address some of the issues and protect the
privacy and security by specifying penalties to individuals breaching the legal barriers. For example,
the HIPAA specifies up to 10 years’ imprisonment for selling patient’s health records when sensitive
material about a person’s health issues are exposed and social damage is done, legislation can be
applied [9]. However, there is no way to revoke the information or to restitute the individual. Therefore,
technological means to enforce privacy protection and prevent security and privacy breaches are of
extreme significance.
3. Issues in Currents RPM Devices
Telehealth research shows that one of the main gaps in RPM architecture research is that the
issue of security is not considered, because the researchers are not familiar with it [11]. These findings
suggest that telehealth and Remote Patient Monitoring (RPM) devices could provide a perfect playing
field for opportunistic security attacks. In addition, the current RPM devices are limited in terms of the
number of users that can use each device at a given time and only the person who is being monitored
is allowed to use the device [12,13]. Therefore, should another person use the same device, then an
incorrect reading will be sent to the patient record [13,14].
The findings in the literature have identified that there is little empirical evidence on how security
is implemented in RPM devices, or if it has been done it has been done poorly [11]. In addition, none
of the studies conducted so far have addressed the issue of how best to implement security on RPM
devices due to lack of standards that define interoperability [15]. Most of the studies have assumed the
role of security to be the responsibility of medical device manufacturers [15].
The additional problem in the current architecture of RPM devices included the issue of
verification of the person using the device because the measurement is not supervised at home
and the device does not have a mechanism for identification and authentication [16]. Therefore, if the
patient’s ID is not verified then, once again, incorrect data may be placed in the patient’s record with
the possibility of incorrect diagnosis and incorrect treatment [12,13,16].
Therefore, there is a need to address a number of the key questions in the RPM device
architecture [14], as follows:
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• How can a clinician trust the data measured by a patient at home if it is not supervised and the
patient is in a multi-user environment?
• How can patients use RPM devices while ensuring their privacy and controlling the use of
information in a simple intuitive way?
If more than one person uses the same device without identification there is a likelihood of
the wrong measurement being transferred to the wrong user which can lead to the user getting the
wrong intervention.
To address these issues, an appropriate identification technique inbuilt in RPM devices can be
beneficial in settings such as care homes for the elderly and households that have two or more people
suffering from the same chronic disease, as it will cater for a large number of users to be monitored
and thus reduce costs associated with having multiple devices. However, with the current architecture
this possibility is limited [13].
A review of current ISO/IEEE 11073 family of standards shows that these standards do not
provide any scheme to ensure security of data exchange but assume that data exchange is secured by
other means, for example when data is passing through a secure transport channel [17]. In addition,
review of ISO/IEEE11073 PHD standards reveals that these standards bring the possibility to record
medical data related to patient ID but do not define how the mapping is going to be achieved and
leave mapping out to the design manufacturers as this in not within the scope of these standards [15].
Additionally, the ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD standards permits agents to record data; however these agents
(e.g., BP monitor, weighing scale, insulin pump) are not connected to a manager (e.g., cell phones,
personal computers, personal health appliances, and set top boxes) and the standards permit managers
to request all stored data [15]. Therefore, without proper mapping and an appropriate identification
technique to identify the patient, a situation can arise where managers will not be able to verify which
readings belong to them. Further security issues can arise when managers are infected with malware,
which have the ability to change data formats.
4. Threats and Risks
The key users of PHDs include users such as patients, healthcare professionals, caregivers, and
technicians and there are a number of security threats and risks involved in the use of PHDs, which
are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of security threats and risks in PHDs.
Threat and Risk Examples
Human Issues
Usability
Since a PHD and the managing software are used by the user/patient, they
need to be as user friendly and as easy to use as possible. Since this
technology is for the elderly and some of them might have other disabilities,
the system must adhere to usability and accessibility guidelines. Research
shows that humans are the weakest link in the security chain and many
attacks in computer systems are through social engineering [18]. For
example, using a covert channel to deceive a healthcare provider employee
to gain access to a person’s medical record.
Missing information
about how to use a PHD
Placing the blood pressure cuff incorrectly might lead to misleading results
and wrong medical treatment being triggered [19]. Therefore, detailed and
user oriented manuals and descriptions of PHDs are necessary.
PHD technical failure
Threats and risks also might arise from technical failures of PHDs, which
might vary from a device sending wrong or no data to communication
limitation or even complete breakdown. This can have an impact
on availability.
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Table 1. Cont.
Threat and Risk Examples
PHD abuse
Agent device abuse
Device might be stolen and switched by a compromised agent that either
deliberately provides wrong data that will trigger wrong treatment or
intercepts patient and medical data [20].
Abuse of device manager software
For technical reasons, wireless communication is much more likely to be
compromised, which is similar to misuse of agent devices, and the
transmitted information could either be altered and entered into the
communication channel [18,21].
Manager to telemonitoring server abuse
Device fraud and manipulation are possible abuse cases. For example,
eavesdropping, which is common to attackers since data from various
devices have already been merged and formatted for transmission [18,21].
Telemonitoring server abuse
Many abuse cases transpire within healthcare provider organisations where
a large number of users and devices access large amounts of
user/patient-specific data through many process steps [18]. The wide range
of applications or devices in the healthcare organisation has many targets
for attacks and setups for abuse; hence, any component might be tampered
with, every transport channel snooped, data manipulated or even deleted,
which creates issues of availability when patient data is needed. Therefore,
appropriate access control need to be put in place.
Threat Modelling
Threat modelling methodology involves optimisation of Network/Application/Internet security
through identifying objectives, threats, and defining countermeasures to mitigate the effects of the
threat [22]. Threat modelling plays a vital part of the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process
because it helps in identification of system vulnerabilities and threats and helps in establishing
appropriate mitigation techniques [23]. Thus, threat modelling can be used in medical devices to
optimise mitigations through identification of threats and vulnerabilities to a specific device from an
organisation supply chain that can harmfully affect the safety of the patient [7]. The threat modelling
tool can be used to detect security threats and vulnerabilities in other remote controlled devices.
To display security design flaws and vulnerabilities and threats in in the current PHDs, the present
study uses the Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool (version 2016, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA,
USA) to show a threat model of a blood pressure monitor (Figure 1).
In Figure 1, the patient is represented as a user, the blood pressure monitor represents the agent
device, the smartphone represents the manager, and the telemonitoring represents the server.
Table 2 below represents the report produced from threat modelling software with
additional modification.
Table 2. Current threats and vulnerabilities in Bluetooth (BTCommands) Interaction.
Threat Category Description Requirement
Potential data
repudiation Repudiation
Smartphone claiming it did not receive
data from a source outside the
trust boundary.
Digital signatures can be used to
counter this threat. Therefore, it is
important to have audit trails from the
source, indicating time and the
summary of the data received.
Spoofing the blood
pressure process Spoofing
The blood pressure monitor may be
spoofed by an attacker and this may
lead to information disclosure
by smartphone.
With lack of authentication mechanism
to identify the destination would mean
that this attack would likely occur.
Encryption can also be used in
preventing information disclosure.
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Table 2. Cont.
Threat Category Description Requirement
Spoofing the
smartphone process Spoofing
The smartphone may be spoofed by an
attacker and this may lead to
information disclosure by smartphone.
With lack of authentication mechanism
to identify the source would mean that





Smartphone may be able to impersonate
the context of blood pressure monitor in








An attacker may pass data into
smartphone in order to change the flow
of program execution within
smartphone to the attacker‘s choosing.
Encryption and access control
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Figure 1. Blood pressure threat model.
Information displayed in Table 2 can be used for mitigation purposes and in prevention of threats
and vulnerabilities identified in the threat model.
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5. Security Models
Other frameworks which have been proposed by other authors [24,25] provide analysis required
for secure health. Although there is some significance in these frameworks, the authors believe that a
new framework is required that incorporates the functionalities of these frameworks, in contexts of
major entities such as, cloud infrastructure, applications, and cognitive capabilities of elderly as they
are the largest beneficiaries of RPM. Therefore, these frameworks are able to serve as reference models.
United4health functional model provides detailed analysis of how to implement end to end
security in an RPM architecture.
The next section looks at United4Health security model and its description.
5.1. United4Health Telehealth Functional Model
A study conducted by [26] on security for United4Health telehealth trial system for chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) patients project provided analysis of security in RPM devices.
Although their functional model has not been implemented in RPM, it provides a detailed overview
of the security requirements for security in RPM. In their functional model they recommended the
use of PINs for identification of the patient, considering this technology is for the elderly who might
have cognitive impairments, this approach would not be practical for them, the authors further add
that, when the users forget their PINs they have to place a call to the nurses supporting the service to
support them, this approach will not be practical in the real world. Additionally, they do not address
the issue of a multi-user environment, where users have to share a single device.
Therefore, there is need for an identification solution that incorporates other aspects of disability
for the elderly so that any technology presented to them is easily acceptable. In the [26] study other
security aspects are ignored, which are fundamental in delivering quality of care to the patient such as:
• Device authentication
This threat occurs when an unauthenticated device is introduced into an RPM ecosystem. Device
authentication will ensure that only authorised devices are allowed in the network. In healthcare,
diseases such as diabetes rely on accurate measurements for treatment, if a device is lost or is
replaced with a rogue device and then introduced into the ecosystem, there are high chances of
it sending the wrong reading, which will trigger the wrong treatment that might endanger the
patient’s life [20].
• Data availability
This are measures taken to ensure that data continues to be available at a required level of
performance in situations ranging from normal to a disaster. Without appropriate security
measures in the telemonitoring server and the manager device, it is highly likely that data can be
made unavailable or be compromised. This model does not address the issue of data availability.
• Manager device security
Security issues can arise when managers are infected with malware, which have the ability to
change data format. The authors of United4Health (United4Health—project aimed to exploit and
further deploy innovative telemedicine services implemented and trialed under the RENEWING
HEALTH project [26]) failed to mention on security requirements of the manager device which is
very crucial.
Figure 2 below shows the United4Health telehealth system functional model.
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• Point of care
The patient takes their readings from the SpO2 sensor device which communicates the
measurement through a wireless Bluetooth device to the manager device. The data from the SpO2
is stored in a local database on the manager device. The manager device then transmits the data to
the HIS infrastructure. The patient authenticates themselves using a PIN on the manager device.
A username and PIN is used to identify the patient.
• Health Information service
From the manager device, the data is transmitted and stored in a PEHR. Clinicians and carers can
access the data through a telehealth service which provides web based information.
Uses HTTPS for providing end to end encryption communication between the manager device
and the PEHR. The unique device identifier of the manager device and the corresponding
symmetric key known to the PEHR is used for authentication and for establishing bidirectional
session encryption.
• Health care and sources
Different organizations, clinicians, and care professionals get access to the data from the patients.
This can be viewed through a web-portal containing details of the data being monitored from the
HIS infrastructure. It uses a role based access control for the users of the system.
United4health functional model provides a detailed overview of the security requirements of the
RPM system.
5.2. The New Security Framework for RPM Devices
The researchers propose a security model for RPM devices (Figure 3), which offers the most
comprehensive security framework proposed so far. The construction of the proposed framework is
drawn from guideline in literature and the threat model used. Therefore, the proposed framework
provides an essential ground for understanding and examining security in RPM.
Various components of the proposed security model for RPM devices are described below.
5.2.1. Home Area Network
Since the proposed technology is for the elderly, usability plays an important role, from switching
on the device to patients identifying themselves to the device with their NFC tags and sending the BP
readings, the sequence and prompts need to be easy to follow. For improving usability, a few prompts
have also been proposed to ensure that it is easy to learn and follow.
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How It Will Work
A patient identifies themselves using their NFC tag on the NFC reader, then they take their blood
pressure. The system will then check if the patient or the carer has been assigned the capability of
sending the BP reading, if yes, then the system will allow the sender to send the BP readings.
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A Capability-Based System for the Secure Use of NFC
A capability is a software construct that specifies the right of its holder to invoke operations on a
defined system object via a communications port [27]. Identification with NFC alone is not sufficient;
therefore, there is need for a solution that will increase the security within the NFC framework.
This study proposes the use of a capability-based system to enhance security for tele-monitoring
systems because the NFC_ID and the PHD device ID can be changed or tampered with either while
in storage or in use; thus, resulting in misdiagnosis or fatality [13]. In addition, this study proposes
the use of different NFC tags such as, cards, key fobs, and wristbands among the users for distinction
purposes. In an environment such as home, errors such as using the wrong tag are likely to occur. Clear
marking and using picture icons representing different sexes can play a significant role in mitigating
tag mix-up errors. Currently, a trial is being conducted with a modified blood pressure monitor
incorporated with NFC with elderly patients who are couples living within the same household and
suffering from hypertension.
Computers 2017, 6, 11 9 of 12
The capability based system only authenticates registered devices and in case a rogue device
is introduced in the eco-system an alert will be raised, which will prevent the device from sending
its readings.
It is imperative to highlight that the IEEE 11073 PHD standards does not specify security
requirements of the manager device whereas the current study proposes that security requirements
for a manager device need to be defined because the manager device is vulnerable to security threats
and this can be seen from the threat model Table 2. The proposed framework used the threat model
in Figure 1 to identify existing threats in RPM devices. The proposed framework offers mitigation
techniques that can be used in preventing threats in existing devices. The threat modelling tool is
useful in identifying security threats and vulnerabilities.
The manager device is vulnerable to malware, which can corrupt and change the data format.
An anti-virus can be used in protection against malware and viruses. In addition, the threat model
identified spoofing and repudiation threat between agent manager communication. Therefore, it is
important that the sender identity is verified and use of digital signatures can be used to prevent issues
of non-repudiation.
5.2.2. Telemonitoring Server Infrastructure
The data collected from patients using PHDs is stored in the telemonitoring server at the
clinic/hospital monitoring the patients. Security at the telemonitoring server is very important
because it ensures confidentiality, availability, and privacy of the patient’s health records and without
appropriate security measures the telemonitoring server can be vulnerable to security attacks. To ensure
availability of data in case the telemonitoring server gets compromised, this study proposes storage of
data in the cloud.
Asymmetric keys can be used in establishing session encryption, which utilises Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).
In addition, digital certificates can be issued and validated by a Certification Authority (CA) in
authentication of managers and telemonitoring server.
5.2.3. Cloud Server Infrastructure
The current study proposes cloud infrastructure for ensuring availability and security of
PHR/EHR. The proposed file system will be a distributed file system that encrypts all the data blocks.
The data blocks will be replicated and placed randomly on a number of cloud block storage servers [27].
However, it is worth to note that each country will have different jurisdictional requirements on data
security. In order to improve security, the meta-data part of the file will not be stored in the cloud.
The meta-data is protected so that in case an intruder manages to decode a block of data, it would still
be very difficult to read the whole file. The new file system is shown in Figure 3. The blocks of data are
encrypted using AES 256-bit encryption the recommended encryption algorithm by the NHS in the
UK [28].
The proposed system fulfils the HIPAA requirements for security of patients’ data.
5.2.4. Surgery Telehealth Services
In the surgery/clinic, different people might have access to patient records; therefore, there is a
need to protect the privacy and confidentiality of a patient’s health records. Only authorized personnel
with the right access rights depending on their job roles should be allowed to have access to these
records. Therefore, the current study proposes the use of a capability based system because capabilities
allow to run a role-based mechanism so restrictions can be based on the roles of different people within
the healthcare system such as doctors, nurses, technicians, and administrators [27]. Capabilities offer
a cleaner set of protection mechanisms in a role-based systems since capabilities for a given role can
be managed together. In addition, capabilities are better at providing better support for multi-role
situations. Because of the large quantities of data to be managed, capabilities are now being used to
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secure objects compared to using Access Control Lists (ACLs). Therefore, in the proposed model, each
entity must have a capability, for example people, devices and infrastructure all must have capabilities.
Capabilities can also be used to provide restrictions, data access, and resources to personnel based
their roles. Figure 4 presents the new format that will be used to present the capabilities.
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T e current st ndards such as the IEEE 11073 do not address the issue of patient id ntification
even though they say mapping is possible they do not define how i is going to be achieved. For this to
be achieved there is a ne d of an interoperable standard that can define patient id tification. Future
work can be done to define an interoperable standard that will allow patient identification to be added
on RPM devices.
6. Conclusions
Security is becoming an issue of major concern and for telehealth to be successful, security has
to be a top priority. Technologies such as NFC have been proposed in this study to address the issue
of multi-user device patient identification. The RPM security model will help in mitigating security
vulnerabilities and threat in an RPM ecosystem and possibly improve security. For telehealth to
Computers 2017, 6, 11 11 of 12
be widely accepted, issues such as usability need to be made a top priority considering that this
technology is used by the elderly.
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